

CommCSL: Proving Information Flow Security for Concurrent Programs Using Abstract Commutativity

Marco Eilers

Thibault Dardinier


Peter Müller

Value Leaks: Noninterference

```
def compute(h: int, l: int):  
    if h > 0:  
        res = 1  
    else:  
        res = 2  
    return res
```


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
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
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
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


Timing side channels

```
def compute(h: int, l: int):  
    res = 0  
    if h > 0:  
        res += 1  
        res += 4  
        res -= 7  
    return 1
```




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Timing side channels

```
def compute(h: int, l: int):  
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    return 1
```



Concurrency
turns
timing channels
into
value channels

Shared-Memory Concurrency


```
while i < h:
    i += 1
shared = 6
```

```
while j < 100:
    j += 1
shared = 7
```

```
return shared
```

Shared-Memory Concurrency

```
while i < h:      | while j < 100:  
    i += 1        |     j += 1  
    shared = 6    |     shared = 7  
                  |  
                  | return shared
```



Shared-Memory Concurrency

```
while i < h:
    i += 1
shared = 6

while j < 100:
    j += 1
shared = 7

return shared
```

Secret value



Execution time



Order of modifications of shared data



Final result value

Attacker:
Observes only *final results*,
not intermediate state or **timing**

Existing (Modular) Solutions

```
while i < h:
    i += 1
shared = 6

while j < 100:
    j += 1
shared = 7

return shared
```

Secret value



influences

Execution time



influences

Order of modifications of shared data



influences

Final result value

Existing (Modular) Solutions



```
while i < h:      | while j < 100:
    i += 1        |     j += 1
    shared = 6    |     shared = 7
                  |
                  | return shared
```

Secret value

↓ influences

Execution time

↓ influences

~~Order of modifications of shared data~~

↓ influences


Final result value

Existing (Modular) Solutions



```
while i < h:      while j < 100:
    i += 1        j += 1
    shared = 6    shared = 7

return shared
```



Goal:

Modularly reason about ***values***
in concurrent programs
without reasoning about ***timing***

Our Solution

```
shared = 1
while i < h:      | while j < 100:
    i += 1        |     j += 1
    atomic:       |     atomic:
        shared += 6 |         shared += 7
return shared
```

Secret value

↓ influences

Execution time

↓ influences

Order of modifications of shared data

↓ influences


Final result value

Key Idea:

Order does not influence result if modifications
commute


Our Solution

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shared = 1
while i < h:      while j < 100:
    i += 1        j += 1
    atomic:       atomic:
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return shared
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


Our Solution


```
shared = 1
while i < h:      | while j < 100:
  i += 1          |   j += 1
  atomic:         |   atomic:
    shared += 6   |   shared += 7
  return shared
```



Basic Solution




Basic Solution



Prove: Same initial values


Basic Solution



Prove: Same initial values

Prove: Updates commute


Basic Solution



Prove: Same initial values

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Basic Solution




Prove: Same initial values

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Prove: Same updates

Basic Solution




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Basic Solution



Prove: Same initial values

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
Prove: Same updates

Assume: Same final values

We can do even better.

We can do even better


```
shared = new List()
while i < h:
    i += 1
    atomic:
        shared.add(6)
while j < 100:
    j += 1
    atomic:
        shared.add(7)
return sort(shared)
```




Key Idea:
Commutativity *modulo abstraction*.

We can do even better

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while i < h:
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Improved Solution




Prove: Same initial values

Prove: Updates commute

Prove: Same updates

Assume: Same final values

Improved Solution



Prove: Same initial values
modulo abstraction


Prove: Updates commute
modulo abstraction

Prove: Same updates

Assume: Same final values
modulo abstraction

We can do even better

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while i < h:
    i += 1
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        shared.add(6)
while j < 100:
    j += 1
    atomic:
        shared.add(7)
return sort(shared)
```



CommCSL

- Relational concurrent separation logic
- Thread-modular reasoning, mutable heaps
- Support for (abstract) commutativity-based information flow reasoning
- Formalized and proved sound in Isabelle/HOL

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} = \Gamma \Rightarrow x \notin \text{fv}(\Gamma)}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P[e/x]\} x := e \{P\}} \text{ (ASSIGN)} \quad \frac{x \notin \text{fv}(e) \quad \Gamma_{\perp} = \Gamma \Rightarrow x \notin \text{fv}(\Gamma)}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{\text{emp}\} x := \text{alloc}(e) \{x \mapsto^1 e\}} \text{ (NEW)} \\
 \\
 \frac{x \notin \text{fv}(e_1, e_2) \quad \Gamma_{\perp} = \Gamma \Rightarrow x \notin \text{fv}(\Gamma)}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{e_1 \mapsto^r e_2\} x := [e] \{e_1 \mapsto^r e_2 * x = e_2\}} \text{ (READ)} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{e_1 \mapsto^1 \dots\} [e_1] := e_2 \{e_1 \mapsto^1 e_2\}} \text{ (WRITE)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge b\} c_1 \{Q\} \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge \neg b\} c_2 \{Q\}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge \text{Low}(b)\} \text{if } (b) \text{ then } \{c_1\} \text{ else } \{c_2\} \{Q\}} \text{ (IF1)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge b\} c_1 \{Q\} \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge \neg b\} c_2 \{Q\} \quad \text{unary } Q}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} \text{if } (b) \text{ then } \{c_1\} \text{ else } \{c_2\} \{Q\}} \text{ (IF2)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge b\} c_1 \{P \wedge \text{Low}(b)\}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge \text{Low}(b)\} \text{while } (b) \text{ do } \{c_1\} \{P \wedge \neg b\}} \text{ (WHILE1)} \quad \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P \wedge b\} c_1 \{P\} \quad \text{unary } P}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} \text{while } (b) \text{ do } \{c_1\} \{P \wedge \neg b\}} \text{ (WHILE2)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} c_1 \{R\} \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{R\} c_2 \{Q\}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} c_1; c_2 \{Q\}} \text{ (SEQ)} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} \text{skip}\{P\}} \text{ (SKIP)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P_1\} c_1 \{Q_1\} \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P_2\} c_2 \{Q_2\} \quad \text{fv}(P_1, c_1, Q_1) \cap \text{mod}(c_2) = \emptyset \quad \text{fv}(P_2, c_2, Q_2) \cap \text{mod}(c_1) = \emptyset \quad \Gamma_{\perp} = \Gamma \Rightarrow \text{fv}(\Gamma) \cap \text{mod}(c_1, c_2) = \emptyset \quad P_1 \text{ is precise or } P_2 \text{ is precise}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P_1 * P_2\} c_1 || c_2 \{Q_1 * Q_2\}} \text{ (PAR)} \\
 \\
 \frac{P \Rightarrow P' \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P'\} c \{Q'\} \quad Q' \Rightarrow Q}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} c \{Q\}} \text{ (CONS)} \quad \frac{\text{fv}(R) \cap \text{mod}(c) = \emptyset \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} c \{Q\} \quad P \text{ is precise or } R \text{ is precise}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P * R\} c \{Q * R\}} \text{ (FRAME)} \\
 \\
 \frac{x \notin \text{fv}(c) \quad \Gamma_{\perp} = \Gamma \Rightarrow x \notin \text{fv}(\Gamma) \quad \Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{P\} c \{Q\}}{\Gamma_{\perp} \vdash \{\exists x. P\} c \{\exists x. Q\}} \text{ (EXISTS)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma = \langle \alpha, f_{as}, f_{au}, I(x) \rangle \quad \Gamma \text{ is valid} \quad I(x) \text{ is unary and precise} \quad \Gamma \vdash \{P * \text{sguard}(1, \emptyset^*) * \text{uguard}([\])\} c \{Q * \text{sguard}(1, x_s) * \text{PRE}_s(x_s) * \text{uguard}(x_u) * \text{PRE}_u(x_u)\}}{\perp \vdash \{I(x) * \text{Low}(\alpha(x)) * P\} c \{\exists x'. I(x') * \text{Low}(\alpha(x')) * Q\}} \text{ (SHARE)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma = \langle \alpha, f_{as}, f_{au}, I(x) \rangle \quad I(x_v) \text{ is unary and precise} \quad x_v \notin \text{fv}(P, Q) \quad x_s, x_a, x_v \notin \text{mod}(c) \quad \text{noguard}(P) \quad \text{noguard}(Q) \quad \perp \vdash \{P * I(x_v)\} c \{Q * I(f_{as}(x_v, x_a))\}}{\Gamma \vdash \{P * \text{sguard}(r, x_s)\} \text{atomic } c \{Q * \text{sguard}(r, x_s \uparrow^{\#} \{x_a\}^*)\}} \text{ (ATOMICSHR)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma = \langle \alpha, f_{as}, f_{au}, I(x) \rangle \quad I(x_v) \text{ is unary and precise} \quad x_v \notin \text{fv}(P, Q) \quad x_v, x_a, x_v \notin \text{mod}(c) \quad \text{noguard}(P) \quad \text{noguard}(Q) \quad \perp \vdash \{P * I(x_v)\} c \{Q * I(f_{au}(x_v, x_a))\}}{\Gamma \vdash \{P * \text{uguard}(x_s)\} \text{atomic } c \{Q * \text{uguard}(x_s + + [x_a])\}} \text{ (ATOMICUNQ)}
 \end{array}$$

HyperViper

- Automated, SMT-based verifier
 - Based on Viper and Z3
- User provides specifications, shared resource information
- Implements superset of CommCSL

```
lockType MapLock {  
  type MyMap[Int, Int]  
  invariant(l, v) = [l.lockMap |-> ?mp && isMap(mp)  
                    && v == mapValue(mp)]  
  alpha(v): Set[Int] = keys(v)  
  
  actions = [(Put, Pair[Int, Int], duplicable)]  
  
  action Put(v, arg)  
    requires low(fst(arg))  
    { (put(v, fst(arg), snd(arg))) }  
}  
  
method worker(inputs: Seq[Ref], l: Lock, lbl: Int)  
  requires low(|inputs|)  
  requires sguard[ListLock, Append](l, Set(lbl))  
  requires ...  
  ensures sguard[ListLock, Append](l, Set(lbl)) && ...  
{  
  ...  
}
```

Open source: <https://github.com/viperproject/hyperviper>

Evaluation

Example	Data structure	Abstraction	LOC	Ann.	T
Count-Vaccinated	Counter, increment	None	44	46	10.15
Figure 2	Integer, add	None	129	95	10.90
Count-Sick-Days	Integer, add	None	52	45	13.67
Figure 1	Integer, arbitrary	Constant	29	20	1.52
Mean-Salary	List, append	Mean	80	84	14.10
Email-Metadata	List, append	Multiset	82	75	16.70
Patient-Statistic	List, append	Length	73	70	4.92
Debt-Sum	List, append	Sum	76	81	14.45
Sick-Employee-Names	Treeset, add	None	105	113	28.43
Website-Visitor-IPs	Listset, add	None	74	69	6.20
Figure 3	HashMap, put	Key set	129	96	10.37
Sales-By-Region	HashMap, disjoint put	None	129	104	12.37
Salary-Histogram	HashMap, increment value	None	135	109	13.78
Count-Purchases	HashMap, add value	None	137	109	11.73
Most-Valuable-Purchase	HashMap, conditional put	None	140	118	17.87
1-Producer-1-Consumer	Queue	Consumed sequence	82	88	3.23
Pipeline	Two queues	Consumed sequences	122	100	3.66
2-Producers-2-Consumers	Queue	Produced multiset	130	134	8.45

Conclusion

- Modular reasoning about value sensitivity for concurrent programs
 - Independently of timing
 - Sound on real hardware
- Key idea is commutativity modulo abstraction
- Formalized in CommCSL
- Proved sound in Isabelle
- Automated in HyperViper

